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NOTES

carrying out the intent of the settlor as balanced by the community's interest in
protecting the well-being of wife or minor child.
Some cases which have allowed the income of a spendthrift trust to be reached
have predicated the decisions on the construction of the creating instrument by
reasoning that the settlor did not intend that a wife or minor child be excluded. 83
Such decisions are strained. It would be more realistic to state that if the settlor had
such intention he would have expressed it. The underlying bases of such decisions
seem to be that of public policy in allowing the trust to be reached, and it would
be more desirable for the courts to state frankly that spendthrift trusts are not immune
from support or alimony claims.
The public policy argument should also apply even where the wife and minor
child were specifically excluded. However, in Schwager v. Schwager,"4 the court
refused to go this far and gave effect to the express intent of the settlor. In Brant v.
Brant,"5 under a statute which allowed the income to be reached for support of wife
or child, the court refused to allow the corpus of a spendthrift trust to be reached
for support of minor child.
It is submitted that in jurisdictions where the question is still open or inconclusive, the courts follow the principal case and other cases which have allowed
recovery for support or alimony. Especially should the courts be thoughtful where
the welfare of a minor child is concerned. At least in the absence of express exclusions as in Schwager v. Schwager, the courts would tend to promote what seems to
be justice by adopting the position of the American Law Institute which provides:
"Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the
beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support or by the wife for alimony; 3 6 . . ."
Rudolph Limon.
WILLS: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE BY HOLOGRAPHIC CoDmcl.-Sometime
prior to April 6, 1947, Dexter G. Johnson typed out his last will and testament but
did not date it, sign it, or have it witnessed. On April 6, 1947, he added on the
same piece of paper in his own handwriting a testamentary disposition to his brother.
He concluded by writing "This will shall be complete unless hereafter altered, changed
or rewritten," whereupon he dated and signed it.
Out of these facts arose the case of Johnson v. Johnson." The court held that
the typewritten paper was a will, but could not be probated because it lacked the
formal requisites of attestation. However, they held that the written addition was
a holographic codicil which incorporated by reference the invalid will and therefore the intentions of the testator, as stated in the typewritten and hand written papers,
could be carried out.
This was a case of first impression in Oklahoma and added that2 state to the list
of states which recognize the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
as In re Stewart's Estate, 334 Pa. 356, 5 A.2d 910 (1939) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super.
578, 172 A. 36 (1934); England v. England, 223 Ill.App. 549 (1922); In re Moorhead, supra
note 7; Tuttle v. Gunderson, supra note 9; Eaton v. Eaton, supra note 11.
81109 F.2d 754 (C.C.A. 7th 1940); cf. Board of Charities v. Kennedy, 3 Pa.Dist.R. 231,
34 W.N.C. 83 (1894), where the court in dictum declared that an explicit provision excluding the
spendthrift trust from claims for support would be totally void.
soMo. App. - , 273 S.W.2d 734 (1954); accord, Buchner v. Buchner, 34 D&C 597
(Pa.Mun, 1939) (beneficiary entitled to income, held corpus unreachable) ; Erickson v. Erickson,
197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161 (1936) ; cf. Zouck v. Zouck, supra note 15.
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 157 (1948 supp.).
R1
'279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).
21 PACE, Wu.Ls §§ 251-55 (3rd Ed. 1941) ; 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 211 (1952) ; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d
821 (1952).
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While the doctrine is not new, there has been a reluctance to extend it, especially
where a holographic codicil, not requiring witnesses, is involved. This is caused not
only by the fear of a greater opportunity for fraud,3 but also because of the confusion
surrounding the doctrine. The problem is made more complex by the courts' indiscriminate use of the terms "incorporation by reference," "integration," and "republication." While these courts may come to a just result, the reasoning leading up to
it is sometimes so confused that it affords no sound basis for an extension of the
principles involved. As an example, the principal case speaks of republication throughout its opinion, yet holds that the codicil incorporated by reference the original
testamentary document.
The doctrines of republication, incorporation by reference, and integration are
separate and distinct rules which should be distinguished.
The theory behind the rule that a codicil republishes a will is that by referring
to a testamentary document it implies that the document still represents the desire
of the testator as of the date of his latest writing. And therefore it is still meant to
be his last will and testament in so far as not changed by the addition. 4 It is because
of this reasoning that a will, invalid because of undue influence, may be republished
by a codicil made under conditions which were free from undue influence. 5 The
doctrine is technically applicable only to a valid will 6 (i.e., one which is capable of
probate) because a will cannot be republished if it has not already been published.
But most courts when discussing the problem of republication make no distinction
as to whether the original will is probatable or not. In addition, many of the courts
talking of republication, as in the Johnson case, apply the rule erroneously, and when
they do allow probate of the will, their decision can more easily be justified on the
basis of incorporation by reference. 7
The theory of incorporation by reference is that a will or codicil meeting all
the statutory requirements for validity may incorporate into itself, by an appropriate
reference, a document, or written paper, whether it is a will or not, and once
incorporated takes effect as part of the will for the purpose of construction.8 The
doctrine has the following requirements: (1) There must be an intent to incorporate
the instrument; (2) the document to be incorporated must be in existence at the
time of the incorporation and not just by the time of probate; (3) The document
must be referred to with reasonable certainty; (4) The document must be in fact
identified as the document referred to; and (5) The document must be the one in
fact intended to be incorporated. 9
It has been stated'0 that the doctrine of incorporation by reference depends on
"the existence of a valid will or codicil which can stand by itself as a probative
instrument, and a non-testamentary paper of some kind" which is given effect by the
codicil and acts as an "appendage" to the will. (Emphasis added.)
Conceding that the doctrine was originally only applicable to non-testamentary
documents, it is believed that the courts have progressed too far in applying it to
testamentary documents to be influenced to disregard it.
Integration, as distinguished from incorporation by reference, occurs when there
' See note 1 supra at 937; 8 VAND. L. R.v. 924, 927 (1955).
' Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920).
' Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 821, 831 (1952).

1 ATKINSON,

WILLS §

89 (2d Ed. 1953) ; Evans, Testamentary Republication, 40 HARv. L. Rv.

71 (1926).
op. cit. supra note 6, § 90; Evans, supra note 6, at 72-73.
op. cit. supra note 6, § 80; Evans, supranote 6.
'ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 8; 1 PAGE ON WILLS § 250 (3rd Ed. 1941) ; Hahn, Can a Valid
Codicil Republish an Imperfectly Executed Will? 17 JBADC 372 (1950) ; 17 MINN. L. R.v. 527
(1932-33).
" Hahn, supra note 9, at 378.
ATKINSON,

* ATKINSON,
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is no reference to a distinctly extraneous document, but it is clear that two or more
separate pieces of paper take effect as the will. 1' Therefore all must be present and
probated as the will.' 2 Usually the separate writings are physically connected, but
this is not absolutely necessary as long as there is some way to "tie-in" the different
documents.
Since it is possible for these doctrines to overlap, it is easy to see how they can
be confused.
It is now settled that a codicil, properly witnessed, may incorporate by reference
a will not wholly in the handwriting of the testator.13 However, even among jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine, there is a split of authority as to whether such a
privilege should be accorded to a holographic codicil.
In Page on Wills, 4 it is stated:
"The holographic will is an apparent, though not a real exception to the general rule
that a codicil, if properly executed, revives a prior will. Since a holographic will must he
entirely in the handwriting of the testator, a holographic codicil which is not attested,
15
does not republish a prior will which is not entirely in the handwriting of the testator."

The leading case cited for the above quotation is Sharp v. Wallace.16 The
Kentucky court applied a statute, similar to one in most states, 17 requiring attestation8
of a will not wholly written by the testator, and the rule, also recognized in most states,'
that the will and codicil are to be construed as one instrument. It held that since
the will and codicil, taken as one instrument, were not wholly written by the testator,
it still required two witnesses to be valid. Most of the other cases denying a holographic codicil the power to incorporate or republish a non-holographic will are based
on the same reasoning.' 9 It is because of this reasoning in the Sharp case that it is
said that the court confused integration with incorporation by reference,2 0 since in
integration the writings are considered as one instrument for all purposes, while
in incorporation by reference they are considered as one instrument for the purpose
of construing the will.
Since Kentucky does recognize incorporation by reference, 2' and also recognizes
that an attested codicil can republish a holographic will, 22 there is no valid reason
why it should not also allow a holographic codicil to incorporate a non-holographic
will. The Kentucky court uses the term "republication" when the term "incorporation"
is proper and it would seem that the cases talking of "republication" where "incorby reference
poration" should be used are good authority for the incorporation
24
doctrine.2 3 And indeed, some writers have used them as such.
That the Sharp case is not deserving of its position as a leading case can readily
"IIn re Fritz's Estate, 102 Cal.App.2d 385, 392, 227 P.2d 539, 543 (1951).
2

op. cit. supra note 8; see Malone, Incorporation by Reference, of an Extrinsic
Document Into a Holographic Will. 16 VA. L. REV. 571 (1929-30).
'8 ATKINSON, Op. cit. supranote 7.
"2 PA E, WILLs § 545 (3rd Ed. 1941).
15 Id. at 14.
18 83 Ky. 584 (1886).
', CALIF. PROBATE CODE § 50: "...
(4) There must be two attesting witnesses, each of whom
must sign his name at the end of the will at the testator's request and in his presence."
18 CALIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 101, 103; see Am. Jnt., WVills § 608 n. 19 for a list of cases.
19 Hinson v. Hinson, 280 S.W.2d 731 (Texas 1955) (dictum) ; Scott v. Gastright, 305 Ky. 340,
204 S.W.2d 367 (1947); Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4 (1916); Gibson v. Gibson,
28 Grat. (69 Va.) 44 (1877).
'o ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 8; Malone, supra note 12. But see Mecham, The Integration
of Holographic Wills, 12 N. C. L. REv. 213 (1933-34).
"See note 2 supra.
' ArKINSON,

"Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950) ; Beall v. Cunningham, 3 B. Mon.
390, 42 Ky. 390 (1843).

" See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 7.
22 PArE, WILLS § 249 n. 1 (3rd Ed. 1941) ; 21 A.L.R.2d 823 (1952).
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be seen when it is realized that the case is cited by one group as representing the
view that a holographic codicil, not witnessed, cannot republish. an unattested will,
not wholly written by the testator; 2 5 by another group as authority for the proposition
26
that a holographic codicil cannot incorporate by reference a non-holographic will;
and by a third
that the case confuses the doctrines of incorporationby reference and
27
integration.
In a California decision, In re Soher,2 8 it is stated that there should be no exception when the codicil is holographic:
"... if an attested will can refer to a document which is not attested, we can see
no good reason why an olographic wil may not refer to a document which is not in the
handwriting of the testator. The only difference between an olographic and an attested
wil is in the form of the execution. The statute has prescribed two forms in which
written wills may be executed. In each case the instrument must be signed by the testator.
But the formality of witnesses is dispensed with if the instrument is all in the handwriting of the testator himself. One form is the precise equivalent of the other. Whatever
would be good as an attested will or codicil is good as an olographic one, if written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator. And whatever may be done in or by one
may be done in or by the other. Therefore, if the formalities of attestation are not required
in a document referred to by an attested will or codicil, the corresponding formalities
are not required in a document referred to by an olographic will or codicil" 2 9 (Emphasis
added.)

The leading case in California is In re Plumel's Estate. ° A will not wholly in
the testator's hand (because of printed "190" in the date) was incorporated by
reference into a holographic codicil written on the back of the will. While the same
problem is involved, the court did not mention the Sharp case or any other case
following the same reasoning, apparently feeling that these cases are irreconcilable
with the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
In the Johnson case, no doubt the dissenting judges would not have been so
disposed to exclude this instrument from probate had they been willing to concede
that the completeness of the will was not important. Why should it matter whether
the will was missing one witness, or did not have any of the requisites for probate?
Should the doctrine of incorporation by reference be any the less applicable when
the instrument to be incorporated is not dated, signed or attested than when the
instrument is not even testamentary in character? Admittedly non-testamentary documents can be incorporated into a validly executed will or codicil. 31
While the Johnson case may have confused the proper application of the two
doctrines of republication and incorporation by reference, the result is compatible
with the proper application of incorporation. And this decision should not lose its
force just because of its loose talk.
The decision in the Johnson case, following as it does the result held in the
Plumel case, should do much in removing from the law this apparent exception,
spoken of by Page.32 The result should be an enforcement of the logic of allowing
a holographic codicil to incorporate a non-holographic will, irrespective of attestation.
Clifford A. Egan.
See note 14 supra.
" Malone, supra note 20; Mecham, supra note 20.
27
ATrKINSON, op. cit. supra note 8; Malone, supra note 20.
28 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8 (1889) ; see also Note, 17 MINN. L. Rav. 527, 533 n. 36 (1933).
2 78 Cal. at 480, 21 Pae. at 9
" 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907).
3157 AM. JUR. Wills 237; ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 8 § 80 n. 5; Annot., 144 A.L.R. 716
(1943).
" See note 14 supra.
25

